Casabona	2005	London	Maintained that global investors and creditors base their decisions on the information reported in different economic, financial, and nonfinancial reports provided by stock exchange enlisted companies.
Owusu-Ansah and Stigler and Alchin	1969	Hong Kong	Considering the available economic facilities for information production and storage, large corporations are inclined to spend more resources for information production, and disclosure of information is higher in large corporations rather than small companies.
Skinner	1994	Seol	found out that the response to larger negative earnings is mostly obtained through voluntary disclosure by companies
Karbasi Yazdi and Bayat	2012	Tehran Stock Exchange	They concluded that social reporting is not well-received for a couple of reasons, namely: absence of a proper accounting information system, reluctance of directors to disclose company’s social costs, absence of legal standards, and high costs of developing social reports. They also provided evidences indicating that directors are more inclined to disseminate measures they have taken concerning employee welfare and health, charity, and environmental protection.
O’Dwyer	2002	Stoklohm	Investigated first-hand the incentives of directors for social information disclosure in annual reports. The results showed that directors maintain that social pressures necessitate the accountability of companies and disclosure of information in annual reports is deemed as a gesture of redeeming their legitimacy.
Dismand and Yan	2009	Shanghai Stock Exchange	Their findings moreover indicated an understanding of disclosure behavior in state-owned entities during the privatization process in China. This study intends to investigate different governance variables and firm-specific characteristics within the framework of Stakeholder Theory.